Internal assistants
Staff chat tools over company documents, with data kept inside policy.
Every team calls the model its own way, with its own keys, and nobody can say what data left the building last week. Agnotic Technologies builds the AI firewall: one gateway between your applications and the models that screens, redacts, checks and logs every exchange.
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An AI firewall is a gateway between your applications and the language models they call. It screens prompts for injection, redacts personal and health data before it reaches a model, checks outputs and tool calls against policy and logs every exchange. Agnotic Technologies builds it for companies running their own LLM applications and agents.
A gateway also solves plainer problems: one place for model keys, rate limits, routing between providers and cost tracking per application.
No filter stops every attack. The gateway reduces what an attack can reach and records what happened, and it sits alongside least-privilege design in the applications themselves.
Where it applies
Any system where a model sees sensitive data or can take an action.
Staff chat tools over company documents, with data kept inside policy.
Support and sales assistants exposed to anyone who types.
Products that send clinical text to a model and must keep PHI controlled.
Assistants that create tickets, update records or send messages.
One gateway for every team instead of keys scattered across services.
A gateway built into the product so customers can see the controls.
Gateway architecture
Each request passes the same stages in order. Responses and tool calls pass back through the checks before they reach the application.
Control table
Agnotic Technologies maps each control to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, and every control has a test that proves it still works.
| OWASP risk | Gateway control | How we test it |
|---|---|---|
| LLM01 Prompt Injection | Input screening on user text and retrieved content, instruction and data kept in separate fields | Injection cases in the red-team suite on every release |
| LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure | PII and PHI redaction before the model, re-detection on output | Seeded test records that must never appear in a response |
| LLM05 Improper Output Handling | Schema validation and encoding before output reaches code, browsers or shells | Malformed and script-bearing outputs fed to the validator |
| LLM06 Excessive Agency | Tool allow lists, permission checks on parameters, human approval for writes | Attempts to call tools and actions the test user is not allowed |
| LLM07 System Prompt Leakage | No secrets in prompts, output scan for prompt fragments | Extraction prompts scored as fail if any fragment appears |
| LLM10 Unbounded Consumption | Token caps, rate limits and per-application budgets | Load tests that confirm limits trip and recover |
The remaining categories, such as supply chain and data poisoning, are handled in model selection and the retrieval pipeline, and are tested in the evaluation suite.
Failure points
These are the failures we have to plan for. None of them is solved by adding one more filter.
Challenge
Injection hidden in a retrieved document
Agnotic approach
Retrieved text is screened before it enters the prompt and is passed as data, never as instructions.
Challenge
Redaction that removes the meaning
Agnotic approach
Consistent tokens replace names and IDs, so the model can still reason about who is who, and the gateway restores them only for authorised users.
Challenge
Over-blocking that drives users around the gateway
Agnotic approach
Blocked requests are reviewed weekly and rules are tuned, so teams have no reason to call models directly.
Challenge
Logs that become the biggest PHI store
Agnotic approach
Logs keep redacted text by default, with access limited and retention set by your policy.
Challenge
Latency that breaks the product
Agnotic approach
Checks run in parallel where they can, with a latency budget per application and lighter checks for low-risk routes.
Challenge
An agent allowed to do too much
Agnotic approach
Tools are granted per application, parameters are checked against the user's own permissions and writes wait for approval.
Scope drivers
We scope the gateway on a call. These factors move effort most.
Each application brings its own policies, tools and log needs.
Routing across several providers and self-hosted models adds adapters and fallbacks.
PHI, payment data or legal documents each need their own detection and redaction rules.
Tool brokering and approval flows are the largest part of the work for agent products.
Real-time voice or chat needs a tighter check design than batch document work.
The gateway becomes evidence for security reviews, so its own controls matter as much as the ones it enforces.
Application, user, model, policy results and timing for every request, kept tamper-evident.
Security reviewers see blocked events; raw content access needs a separate, logged approval.
Model providers that may receive PHI are covered by agreements before traffic is routed to them.
Provider keys live in a secrets manager used only by the gateway, rotated on a schedule.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Protect PHI with privacy-first architecture, encrypted storage and transmission, strict access controls, and traceable audit logs.
General Data Protection Regulation
Implement lawful consent flows, data minimization, retention controls, and secure processing for sensitive health data.
Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources
Enable standardized health data exchange across apps, care teams, and systems through standards-based FHIR APIs.
Health Level Seven International
Support enterprise-grade interoperability with HL7-based integrations for records, events, and clinical messaging workflows.
Health Information Trust Alliance
Align security programs to healthcare-specific control and risk management practices trusted by providers and ecosystem partners.
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
Design with breach notification readiness, digital record safeguards, and operational controls that support regulated care programs.
FDA Software as a Medical Device
Plan software quality, traceability, and documentation pathways for products that may require SaMD review and submission.
Medical Device Regulation (European Union)
Prepare EU market-ready processes for risk classification, evidence tracking, and lifecycle governance under MDR expectations.
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
Apply confidentiality controls and consent-aware sharing models for behavioral and mental health data experiences.
Short facts behind the control table, each linked to its primary source.
OWASP lists prompt injection first in its 2025 Top 10 for LLM Applications, and notes that retrieval augmented generation and fine-tuning do not fully mitigate it.
Source: OWASP LLM01:2025 Prompt InjectionOWASP traces excessive agency, damaging actions taken in response to unexpected or manipulated LLM output, to three root causes: excessive functionality, excessive permissions and excessive autonomy.
Source: OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive AgencyOWASP defines improper output handling as insufficient validation, sanitization and handling of LLM outputs before they are passed to other components, which can lead to XSS, SSRF, privilege escalation or remote code execution.
Source: OWASP LLM05:2025 Improper Output HandlingWhen prompts or responses can carry electronic protected health information, the HIPAA Security Rule requires mechanisms that record and examine activity in the systems that handle it.
Source: 45 CFR 164.312(b) (eCFR)Three stages, starting with the riskiest application.
We list the applications, models, data types and tools, and pick the first application to put behind the gateway.
Gateway ingress, routing, input and output checks and logging for that application, with its red-team cases.
More applications, tool brokering and rule tuning from the weekly review of blocked requests.